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Abstract 
 
In this paper we present empirical results and 
speculative analysis based on observations collected 
over a two month period from studies with two high-
interaction honeynets, deployed in a corporate and an 
SME (Small to Medium Enterprise) environment, and a 
distributed honeypots deployment. All three networks 
contain a mixture of Windows and Linux hosts. We 
detail the architecture of the deployment and results of 
comparing the observations from the three 
environments. We analyze in detail the times between 
attacks on different hosts, operating systems, networks 
or geographical location. Even though results from 
honeynet deployments are reported often in the 
literature, this paper provides novel results analyzing 
traffic from three different types of networks and some 
initial exploratory models. This research aims to 
contribute to endeavours in the wider security research 
community to build methods, grounded on strong 
empirical work, for assessment of the robustness of 
computer-based systems in hostile environments. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper provides details of the research we have 
conducted with two honeynets and a distributed 
honeypots network. One honeynet was deployed in a 
corporate (City University London) network and the 
other one in an external network which was purchased 
from an Internet Service Provider. The latter network 
(which contains 13 static IP addresses) is meant to 
simulate an SME (Small to Medium Enterprise) 
network and therefore allow us to compare the traffic 
observed in the SME and the corporate environments. 
Even though honeynet deployment and results are 
widely reported in the literature we believe that 
analysis comparing traffic from different environments 
is scarce and therefore our findings may be of benefit 
to researchers and practitioners in the field. We have 
been running honeynets in the corporate network since 
March 2006 and in the SME network since February 
2007. This has enabled us to debug the setups and gain 
expertise in the deployment and administration of 
honeynets. Although not reported here, we have 
implemented a systematic approach to the risk 
assessment for the networks and forensic procedures. 
The latter has benefited strongly from our collaboration 
with contacts in the City of London Police (specifically 
the High Tech Crime Unit). We classify honeynets 
according to the attractiveness of the honey and the 
level of interaction offered. The honeynets reported 
here are relatively high-interaction honeynets 
providing potentially attractive honey (in the form of 
computing resources) but we have not deployed any 
information honey. We will also report on the 
attractiveness that the resources have on the traffic 
observed for the corporate network. 
Since March 2007 our centre has joined Leurre.com 
[1] distributed honeypots project. Leurre.com make the 
entire data available to the participating partners (50 
partners for the period we analyzed) who are spread 
around the world. Access to this data enables us to do 
analysis at a much larger scale than running honeynets 
on single sites. 
In this paper we provide a summary of results 
observed for all three aforementioned setups (two 
honeynet networks and the distributed honeypots) in 
the period 21/May/2007 – 22/July/2007. The main 
objective of our research was to monitor, study and 
report the differences in the exposure of the different 
networks and configurations to malignant traffic, and 
not to study the “background radiation” [2] traffic. We 
explored the differences in the traffic that is observed 
in these networks, which are inherently different, rather 
than imposing various artificial constraints or opening 
arbitrary ports for the sake of artificially making the 
honeypots and networks “the same”. In the 
configuration of the hosts in the corporate and SME 
networks we tried to follow best practices for 
deploying hosts in corporate or SME environments and 
we tried to keep the operating systems’ configurations 
and the applications we deployed in the honeypots as 
“off-the-shelf” as possible, since we suspect that is 
how the majority of these installations are done in real 
deployments. We used the Leurre.com traffic as a 
reference to see whether or not the malignant traffic to 
our networks is larger or smaller. We found our traffic 
is smaller but comparable. In summary, our analysis 
and modelling has been “exploratory” rather than 
“explanatory”. 
The research aims to contribute to the attempt under 
way in the wider security research community to build 
rigorous methods for assessing the robustness of a 
computer-based system in a hostile environment. By 
modelling system vulnerabilities and counter-measures 
(both technical and non-technical) we seek to establish 
credible quantitative measures of ease or likelihood of 
exploitation of these vulnerabilities and of the strength 
of the counter-measures. Our approach to security 
assessment is probabilistic. This will allow an 
integrated view of dependability (where reliability, and 
most recently safety, have been accepted as requiring a 
probabilistic approach).  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
contains an overview of the architecture of the 
honeynets deployed – full details of the deployment 
and the various constituent tools of data control and 
data capture are given in [3]; Section 3 contains a 
summary of the results observed and some additional 
exploratory analysis of the results in the three 
networks; Section 4 contains some initial exploratory 
models based on the reported data; Section 5 outlines a 
brief review of related work and Section 6 discusses 
the main findings and presents conclusions and 
provisions for further work. 
 
2. Description of the Test Harness 
Architecture and Experimental Setup 
 
2.1 The Corporate and the SME Honeynets 
 
The main reference point used for the deployment 
of the two honeynets (corporate and SME) is the 
Honeynet Research Alliance “Honeynet Project” [4]. 
The Honeynet Project develops or incorporates the 
collection of tools required for data control and data 
capture: they are provided as a “honeywall”, i.e. an 
installation CD which contains a stripped down version 
(233 RedHat Packages (.rpm files)) of Linux Fedora 
Core 3 and various security and data collection tools 
[5]. This is the CD that we used to install and configure 
the “honeywall” in the two honeynets. We have 
provided full details of the architecture, the constituent 
tools and the deployment procedures in [3]. In what 
follows we will briefly detail the setup to enable the 
reader to follow the results description and discussions 
in subsequent sections. 
Both the corporate and the SME honeynet have the 
same basic network and configuration structure. The 
outline is given in Fig. 1. There are three honeypots 
(running Fedora Core 6, Windows XP Service Pack 2 
and Windows Vista Business Edition respectively). 
The following applications run on each honeypot: 
- Apache web server 2.2.2 [6] 
- PostgreSQL database server 8.0.2 [7] 
- Open Office 2.2 [8] 
- Thunderbird mail client 2 [9] 
The applications above were chosen because: they 
were free and open-source; they were available for 
each of the operating systems installed on the 
honeypots. Apart from the TPC-C (Transaction 
Processing Council - Benchmark C) experimental 
performance benchmarking database [10], which was 
deployed in the PostgreSQL server, there is no other 
content in the honeypots. 
The honeywall has three network interface cards – 
eth0, eth1 and eth2; eth0 and eth1 do not have an IP 
address: they are bridged and the traffic flowing in and 
out of the honeypots passes through this bridge 
(therefore the honeywall is not visible to the attackers); 
eth2 is the management interface: this interface is used 
by the honeynet administrators to monitor the 
honeynet; eth2 only responds to requests on ports 443 
and 22 (secure HTTP (HTTPS) and Secure Shell 
(SSH) respectively) and it only responds to a 
predefined set of trusted hosts.  
 
Honeywall 
(Adapted FC3 
version) 
Linux (FC6) Honeypot 
IP: x.x.x.x 
From the Internet 
To the 
management 
machine 
through HTTPS 
and SSH 
eth2 - IP: x.x.x.x 
eth0 - IP: none 
eth1 - IP: none 
Dedicated 
LAN 
Windows XP SP2 Honeypot IP: 
x.x.x.x 
Windows Vista Business 
Honeypot IP: x.x.x.x 
 
Fig. 1 – The Corporate and the SME honeynet 
architecture (eth2 not configured in the SME). 
The differences in the setup and deployment of the 
corporate and the SME honeynets are: 
- eth2 interface is not configured in the SME 
honeynet: this is because the ISP package we 
purchased for running the SME honeynet did not 
support the assignment of the restrictive features 
that eth2 should have. 
- The corporate honeynet runs behind a firewall (see 
Fig. 2 for details of the location of the corporate 
honeynet in the university network). The firewall is 
configured to be less restrictive to traffic destined 
to our honeynet than the rest of the university 
network. For the SME we could not get any 
information from the ISP about whether they do 
any filtering at a higher level before the traffic 
reaches our segment. Putting the honeypots online 
without any protection seemed unrealistic. We 
therefore followed best practice advice directed to 
home and Small Business users from the UK Get 
Safe Online site [11], and enabled firewalls on the 
honeypots, opening only the ports to the 
applications that were running on the honeypots (80 
for Apache, 5432 for PostgreSQL, and 22 for SSH 
server (in the standard installation of Fedora Core 6 
there is an SSH server installed, but not on the 
Windows honeypots)).   
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Fig. 2 – The location of the Corporate 
Honeynet in the City University network. 
 
2.2 Deployment of a Honeynet without 
Additional Applications in the CORP Network  
 
We have deployed another honeynet in the CORP 
network with only the bare operating systems deployed 
in the honeypots (i.e. without applications such as 
PostgreSQL database server etc., which we installed in 
the honeypots of CORP and SME honeynets described 
in the previous section). This was done to allow 
analysis of the effects that the computing resources (in 
our case applications) have on the traffic observed. The 
architecture of the honeynet with only the operating 
systems in the honeypots is similar to that shown in Fig 
1. The only difference is that we do not have a 
Windows Vista honeypot installed in the honeynet. We 
will summarise the results of comparison of the two 
honeynets in the CORP network in Section 3.3.  
 
2.3 The Leurre.com Distributed Honeypots  
 
The Leurre.com project [1] use a different approach 
to data collection. They use distributed low-interaction 
honeypots which are dispersed throughout the world. 
Membership to Leurre.com project is open to everyone 
as long as the partner organization is willing to sign a 
non-disclosure agreement, is willing to share the 
findings with all the other partners and can provide 4 
IP addresses. Even though 4 IP addresses are required 
only one physical host is used. A RedHat operating 
system is then installed in the host and three other 
virtual hosts are created using honeyd [12] and 
assigned an IP address each. The three hosts emulate 
Windows NT, Windows 98 and Linux RedHat 7.3 
operating systems. The fourth IP address is assigned to 
the physical host itself. All of the data collected from 
each honeypot is flushed to a centralized data 
collection database. This database is then available for 
analysis to all of the participating partners. Since the 
virtual hosts are created using honeyd, the Leurre.com 
can be described as a low-interaction network, i.e. the 
virtual hosts can be configured to run various services 
and appear as though they are running various 
operating systems, but they are not actually real hosts 
and their capabilities are still limited. However there 
are advantages from having a worldwide distributed 
architecture. For example, analysis can be done on how 
the attacks are distributed at a given time throughout 
many different locations in the world. 
  
3. Empirical Results 
 
3.1 Summary of Results 
 
In this section we will present a summary of the 
results observed in the three networks in the period 
21/May/2007 until 22/July/2007. For the sake of 
brevity we use the following abbreviations: 
- CORP – Corporate Honeynet 
- SME – SME Honeynet 
- Leurre – Leurre.com distributed honeypots 
- HP - Honeypot 
- Avg. - Average 
We have also analyzed the traffic from attacking 
hosts that have been observed in more than one 
network. Table 1 contains a summary of the results for 
all three networks. For example, in the last section of 
Table 1 we can see that a total of 225 attacking hosts 
were observed in all three networks. This constitutes 
only 0.09% of the hosts seen in Leurre, but 12.84% of 
the hosts in CORP.   
If we look at the pair-wise comparisons of the 
networks we can see that a high percentage of 
attacking IP addresses that were observed in CORP 
were also observed in the Leurre network (90.09%). 
This figure is lower for the SME attackers found in 
Leurre (34.6%). A possible explanation for the higher 
percentage of commonality of attackers of CORP and 
Leurre (compared with SME and Leurre) is that most 
of the Leurre honeypots are located in large university 
or research institutions (“corporate” networks); 
therefore one would expect the attackers of these two 
networks to be in some way similar.   
Full details and a more detailed empirical analysis 
of the observations are provided in a technical report 
[13]. The following are some of the more interesting 
observations to note about these data: 
- Why is there variation in the overall traffic volume 
in the three networks? Due to the higher number of 
hosts that are active in Leurre network (150 in 
total) the total number of packets observed in 
Leurre is significantly higher than in CORP or 
SME. SME network has the least amount of traffic. 
A possible explanation for the smaller number of 
packets in the SME network is that larger corporate 
networks, whose IP addresses are often public 
(certainly true for CORP honeynet that we run on 
the City University London network), may be more 
tempting for attackers (due to, for example, 
possible access to classified materials on the 
corporate networks; or, for attackers who are after 
resources, the possible availability of a larger 
number of hosts) than SME networks whose 
identity may not be known (if we try to resolve the 
identity of the honeypots in our SME network 
using tools such as whois, the owner is shown to be 
the ISP from whom we purchased the subnet). 
- Which honeypot ports were scanned/attacked most 
frequently? Ports 80, 135, 5900 (used for Virtual 
Network Computing) and Microsoft SQL Server 
ports (1433 and 1434), as well as ICMP traffic that 
does not use a port abstraction, feature in the top 10 
(ranked by total number of packets exchanged) in 
all three datasets. Similarly, five ports feature in the 
top 10 in two networks: 22, 139, 445, 1026 and 
2967. These observations suggest that most of the 
packet exchanges are with ports that have known, 
but mostly patched, vulnerabilities.  
- From which countries were the attacking IP 
addresses? The USA IP addresses exchange most 
of the packets with any of the three networks. In 
terms of the number of distinct attacker IPs, China 
features in the top 5 for any of the three networks. 
It may be surprising to some that the number of 
attacking IPs from Russia (and Eastern Europe in 
general) was relatively small. 
Table 1 – Summarized packet and IP counts for all traffic or only traffic from attacker IPs observed 
in more than one network. 
CORP SME Leurre  
Attacking 
IPs Count 
Packet 
Count 
Avg. per 
Attac. IP  
Attacking 
IPs Count 
Packet 
Count 
Avg. per 
Attac. IP  
Attacking 
IPs Count 
Packet 
Count 
Avg. per 
Attac. IP  
Corp&SME Only 244 7,787 31.91 244 9,237 37.86    
Totals for all IPs 1,752 402,134 229.53 10,028 86,896 8.67    
Ratio of totals 10.67% 1.12%  2.82% 3.96%     
Corp&Leurre Only 1,090 362,268 332.36    1,090 207,363 190.24 
Totals for all IPs 1,752 402,134 229.53    243,188 29,355,199 120.71 
Ratio of totals 62.21% 90.09%     0.45% 0.71%  
SME&Leurre Only    3,470 34,817 10.03 3,470 556,510 160.38 
Totals for all IPs    10,028 86,896 8.67 243,188 29,355,199 120.71 
Ratio of totals    34.60% 40.07%  1.43% 1.90%  
All Three 225 5,501 24.45 225 7,582 33.70 225 82,356 366.03 
Totals for all IPs 1,752 402,134 229.53 10,028 86,896 8.67 243,188 29,355,199 120.71 
Ratio of totals 12.84% 1.37%  2.24% 8.73%  0.09% 0.28%  
 
3.2 “Persistent” vs. “Prolific” Attacking IP 
Addresses 
 
We will now look more closely at the traffic 
originating from the top 10 most “persistent” attacking 
IPs (the ones that have exchanged the most packets 
with the honeypots in the network) and the top 10 most 
“prolific” attacking IPs (the ones that have attacked the 
most honeypots). This analysis aims to clarify the 
understanding about the different strategies that 
attackers are using. Are they going for “depth” attacks, 
i.e. concentrating their efforts on a relatively small 
number of hosts; or for “breadth” attacks, i.e. 
scanning/attacking as high number of hosts as possible. 
  
3.2.1 Analysis of the “Persistent” IP Addresses. Fig. 
3 shows normalised (per honeypot in each network) 
count of packets exchanged with the three networks by 
the top 50 most “persistent” hosts. Note that in the 
figure we have an ordering of the most persistent 
attacking hosts in each network. Therefore they are not 
necessarily the same. The y-axis is drawn in an 
exponential scale. 
 
Fig. 3 - Packet exchanges by the top 50 most 
“persistent” attackers. 
From Table 1 we can see that the total number of 
attacking hosts in each network is much greater than 50 
(1,752; 10,028 and 243,188, for CORP, SME and 
Leurre respectively). Therefore the number of highly 
persistent hosts in each network is relatively low and, 
as a result, the tails of the three lines in Fig. 3 are very 
long. 
 
3.2.2 Analysis of the “Prolific” IP addresses in the 
Leurre Network. Table 2 shows the top ten attacking 
IPs
1
 in terms of number of Honeypots they attacked. 
The table only shows the IPs from the Leurre network 
because significantly higher number of Honeypots 
exist in this network, making the analysis more 
interesting. We can see that 7 out of 10 most prolific 
attacking IP addresses are from China.  
Fig. 4 shows the pattern in which the honeypots 
were discovered by the 50 most prolific IP addresses 
(i.e. the graph shows the elapsed times, in the 
observation period, of the first packet exchanges with 
each honeypot). We can see that the honeypot 
discovery patterns of some of the attackers have a 
convex shape (i.e. the attackers discover a lot of 
honeypots initially in relatively short period of time 
and then take longer to discover the remaining 
honeypots), whereas a few have a concave shape 
(taking longer initially and then increasing the 
discovery rate). This may be due to: 
- the observation period being limited to 63 days 
and consequently some of the discovery patterns 
may be cut short. 
                                                           
1
 The attacking hosts’ IP addresses are not shown due 
to the restrictions of Leurre.com non-disclosure 
agreement. 
- different attackers using different attack strategies, 
e.g. concave: discover new honeypots slowly and 
concentrate attacks against a few hosts, and then 
restart discovery/scanning again. 
- us seeing only part of the global picture of host 
discovery patterns by these attackers, i.e. other 
worldwide hosts (which are not covered by the 
150 hosts in the Leurre network) are maybe being 
discovered by these attackers in between the 
discovery of the Leurre honeypots. 
Table 2 – Top 10 most ‘prolific’ attacking IP 
addresses (anonymised) in the Leurre 
network. The top two hosts are from the same 
C-class subnet. 
Foreign IP Country 
Number of 
HPs attacked 
% of Total 
(150) HPs 
Packet 
count 
A1 China 120 80.00% 3,909 
A2 China 113 75.33% 1,394 
B China 111 74.00% 403 
C China 106 70.67% 2,753 
D USA 105 70.00% 2,013 
E N’lands 105 70.00% 887 
F USA 104 69.33% 7,222 
G China 102 68.00% 1,200 
H China 102 68.00% 285 
I China 101 67.33% 3,464 
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Fig. 4 – Honeypot discovery pattern for the 50 
most prolific attackers. 
Another interesting observation to note about the 
prolific attackers is that when they are scanning 
honeypots that reside in the same network, they seem 
invariably to do so sequentially in ascending numerical 
order of the IP addresses per given site (there are 
exactly 3 hosts per site in Leurre (for the total of 50 
sites there are 150 honeypots)). A related study with 
Leurre network [14] also observed this phenomenon. 
From Table 2 we saw that the top two most prolific 
IP addresses are from the same class C network in 
China. Fig. 5 shows the pattern in which the honeypots 
were discovered by these two IP addresses. We can see 
that the two patterns are quite similar for the discovery 
of the first 100 honeypots. The time to discover the 
remaining ones is much longer for both attackers (the 
“dotted line” one discovers less, due to the observation 
period closing on the 22
nd
 of July 2007).  The “solid 
line” discovery pattern started on the 25
th
 of May 2007; 
the “dotted line” discovery pattern started on the 5
th
 of 
July 2007. It seems highly plausible that the two 
attacking IP addresses might either belong to the same 
attacker who obtained different IPs in these two 
periods, or are two identically compromised/hijacked 
hosts. 
 
Fig. 5 – The Honeypot discovery pattern for 
the two most prolific attacking IPs. 
 
3.2.3 Comparison of the “Persistent” and “Prolific” 
traffic. Table 3 contains a comparison of the traffic 
received by the top 10 most persistent and the top 10 
most prolific attackers. For Leurre these 10 hosts are 
mutually exclusive, for CORP there are 2 hosts in the 
top 10 of both persistent and prolific lists whereas for 
SME this number is 6 hosts. The reason for the higher 
overlaps for SME and CORP is because the number of 
honeypots in these two networks is very small.  
Table 3 – Top 10 hosts: ‘prolific’ vs. 
‘persistent’ attacking hosts traffic comparison. 
  
Packet 
Count 
% of 
total 
traffic 
Avg. 
number of 
HN ports 
attacked 
Avg. 
number 
of hosts 
attacked 
Top 10 Persistent 310,475 77.00 1010.2 2.5 / 4 
C
O
R
P
 
Top 10 Prolific 172,916 43.00 1010 4 / 4 
Top 10 Persistent 20,955 24.12 20.4 2.4 / 3 
S
M
E
 
Top 10 Prolific 12,581 14.48 3.4 3 / 3 
Top 10 Persistent 645,169 2.20 300.3 3.9 / 150 
L
eu
rr
e 
Top 10 Prolific 23,530 0.08 2.8 107/ 150 
The analysis is more interesting for Leurre. We can 
see for example that the top 10 most persistent 
attackers exchanged almost 28 times more traffic with 
the honeypots than the prolific attackers, while at the 
same time concentrating their efforts on a very small 
number of honeypots (3.9 honeypot on average for the 
persistent attackers compared with 107 for prolific 
ones). This table reconfirms that different attackers are 
using different strategies when attacking the honeynets. 
 
3.3 The Effect of Honey (in the Form of 
Computing Resources) on the CORP Traffic 
  
So far we have looked at the differences in traffic 
observed when honeypots are running on different 
networks. To check the effects that the computing 
resources (e.g. the deployed applications on the  
honeypots) have on the traffic we have compared the 
two honeynet deployments in the CORP network (see 
Section 2.2 for a description of the setup). Table 4 
shows a summary of the results. The main findings are 
as follows: 
- The number of attacking IPs observed in the two 
networks is very similar, but the total number of 
packets exchanged by these IPs is 3.5 times higher 
in the CORP honeynet with applications. 
- Most of the packets (82.02% for the honeynet with 
applications and 93.49% for the honeynet without 
applications) are launched by 714 attacking IP 
addresses which reappear in both honeynets.   
Table 4 – Comparison of the two honeynets in 
the CORP network: with and without 
applications in the honeypots. 
 
 
Overlap 
Counts 
Single HN 
counts 
Ratio of 
totals 
Attacking IPs Count 714 1437 49.69% 
Packet Count 282,845 344,858 82.02% 
C
O
R
P
 w
it
h
 
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s 
Avg. per Attac. IP  396.14 239.98 N/A 
Attacking IPs Count 714 1442 49.51% 
Packet Count 92,834 99,302 93.49% 
C
O
R
P
 n
o
 
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s 
Avg. per Attac. IP  130.02 68.86 N/A 
 
4. Initial Exploratory Models 
 
In this section we give details of two exploratory 
models that have been developed based on the data 
presented so far. 
 
4.1 Preferential Attack Model 
 
Using the data for the 10,000 most persistent
2
 
                                                           
2
 Apart from CORP, where there were 1,752 attacking IPs in total. 
Hence, all CORP attacking IPs were included in the analysis. 
attackers we have calculated the distribution of attack 
frequency and the attack size measured by the amount 
of traffic from the source (see Fig. 6).  Each of the 
networks shows a power law between the attack 
probability P per honeypot and size of attack (k). The 
power law is given by: 
γ−
∝ kkP )(  
with γ between 2.5 and 3.6. The power law (>2) 
suggests a scale free, preferential attachment mean-
field model, such as that of [15] and [16], where the 
probability of the next attack coming from source k is 
proportional to amount of traffic seen previously for 
that attacker (n). A preferential attachment model with 
a constant of proportionality (a+n) would give γ = 3 + 
a with a > -1 [16]. It would also predict the constant of 
proportionality to be proportional to the square of the 
total amount of attack traffic. It is tempting to interpret 
the constant a in terms of background radiation [2]. 
The results have implications for the design of 
adaptive defence strategies. 
 
Fig. 6 - Attack frequency vs. Size. 
    
4.2 Empirical Model for the Precursor Attacks 
 
To find out whether attacks on one honeynet could 
be used as a precursor for an attack on another 
honeynet we looked at the distribution of time between 
the earliest Snort IDS (Intrusion Detection System) 
alerts for either of the two honeynets (SME or CORP) 
until the first alert on the second honeynet. We did this 
for the observation period 21/May/2007 to 
22/July/2007 for CORP and SME.  
Fitting Weibull distribution to the data, we found 
that square root of this time has approximately an 
exponential distribution (Fig. 7) with the mean 7.41 for 
all reappearing attacker IPs on both networks 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value is 0.138).  
We also found that the distribution of square root of 
time from the first packet exchange with either 
honeynet until the first packet exchange with the 
remaining honeynet for all reappearing IP addresses is 
also approximately exponential (Fig. 8) with mean 
9.96 (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value is 0.506). 
Thus, an attack on one honeynet could be seen as a 
precursor for an attack on the other. This empirical 
model may therefore help network administrators to 
predict the time of an attack in their network given 
knowledge of an attack on another network. 
 
Fig. 7 – Empirical and fitted distributions of 
absolute values of time difference between 1
st
 
IDS alerts from reappearing attacker IPs. 
 
Fig. 8 - Empirical and fitted distributions of 
absolute value of time difference between 1
st 
packet exchanges from all reappearing 
attacker IPs. 
5. Related work 
 
Numerous publicly available sources publish 
security related data. Examples include SysAdmin, 
Audit, Network, Security (SANS) [17], Carnegie 
Mellon University’s Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERT) [18], Honeynet Project [4] and 
Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis 
(CAIDA) [19]. The last two sources also provide 
various network and security tools. One of the 
problems with analyzing data from these sources is that 
the data is summarized and, thus, it is difficult to 
perform more specific or detailed analysis if the 
required data is not available in the summarized 
reports. 
A related honeynet architecture was built by Michel 
Cukier’s team at the University of Maryland (the 
architecture they developed is outlined in [20]). The 
main difference between the architecture developed in 
[20] and that in [4] (which we have used) is in the way 
the data control and data capture is performed. In [4] 
all the tools are grouped in a single installation CD 
making the deployment and configuration much easier. 
In [20] the data control and data capture is much more 
distributed. Findings and analysis of the results derived 
from the honeynet deployment have been detailed in a 
few papers by Cukier and his team, including: [20] in 
which it was observed that (using their definitions of 
port scan, vulnerability scan and attack) port scans 
should not be considered as precursors to attacks; [21] 
in which the authors provide empirical and statistical 
analysis of classifying attacks directed to Windows 
port 445 (which Short Message Block (SMB) protocol 
uses), concluding that a criterion as simple as the total 
number of bytes per connection is very good for 
separating different attacks on this port, whereas 
number of packets per connection and connection 
duration are not so good; or [22] in which the authors 
analyzed the attacker behavior that follows a successful 
compromise on Secure Shell (SSH) protocol. 
A number of papers have also been published based 
on the analysis of data from the same Leurre.com 
source that we have also used in this paper (though 
these papers use different observation periods than 
what we report). [14] report initial analysis performed 
on the data collected in Leurre.com distributed 
honeypots network. Their results show that 5% of the 
attack sources are observed on at least two honeypots, 
most of the attacks are destined to Windows machines 
and attacks that targeted all three virtual machines on a 
site were performed in a numerical (increasing or 
decreasing)  order of the respective IP addresses. These 
findings are also confirmed by the analysis we did on 
the Leurre.com data for the period reported in this 
paper, 21/May/2007-22/July/2007 (although we found 
that when honeypots from the same network are 
scanned, the scan tends to happen in sequential 
ascending order).  [23] report findings collected during 
a 4 month period using three virtual honeypots 
deployed with VMware software. Most of the attacks 
originated from three countries: Australia, Netherlands 
and USA. The first two are rarely reported as 
“attackers’” country of origin in computer security 
reports. The authors speculate that the targets are 
chosen at random since each one of them is attacked by 
approximately third of all attacking IPs. The most 
targeted port is 139, used for Windows NetBIOS 
protocol. [24] described ScriptGen tool which is used 
for deployment of medium-interaction honeynets. The 
tool enables richer communication with attackers than 
honeyd (used currently by the Leurre.com distributed 
honeypots deployment) without imposing maintenance 
cost and risk of high interaction honeynets. Initial tests 
with the SMB protocol are described. [25] report on 
findings concerning a deployment of a high-interaction 
honeypot to which only SSH connections were 
allowed. The main goal of the experiment was to 
examine the behaviour of the attackers who 
successfully compromise a machine. They identified 
that dictionary attacks were common. By looking at 
the pattern of intrusions they have identified both 
humans and automatic programs as attackers. 
The research detailed in [26] used a deployment of a 
generation I honeynet [27] to monitor traffic and 
identify malicious activities in a corporate environment 
provided by The Georgia Institute of Technology. The 
reported monitoring period lasted for six months. In 
this period 16 machines, which were outside of the 
honeynet’s IP address space, have been discovered as 
compromised. Beside likely worm propagation attacks, 
the honeynet helped in the identification of a system 
with a compromised password. The authors propose 
the use of a distributed honeynet, controlled by a 
network separate from the corporate one, as a means 
for further security enhancement. 
Similarly to the exploratory models in Section 4, the 
work of [28] presents some preliminary analyses and 
modelling techniques to better understand malicious 
activities on the Internet and the corresponding attacker 
strategies. The authors are concerned with time-
evolution modelling of number of attacks as well as 
potential correlations among attacks on geographically 
dispersed platforms. They investigated the distributions 
of attacks on a single platform and, also, the 
propagation of attacks through different platforms. The 
analyses are based on the data collected in Leurre.com. 
The most interesting results are as follows: 
- Trends at a local level do not necessarily follow 
the global trend. 
- Attack processes differ among platforms and they 
are governed by specific factors. 
- Heavy-tailed power law distribution characterises 
the number of attacker IPs as a function of number 
of attacks per platform – few attacker IPs are 
responsible for majority of attacks. 
- The observed times between attacks on a 
particular platform are best characterised using a 
mixture model combining a Pareto and an 
exponential distribution (NB: the exploratory 
model in Section 4.2. is concerned with inter-
platform attacks).  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have reported empirical 
observations and exploratory data analysis based on 
data from three different networks: two honeynets 
running in a corporate and an SME environment (both 
deployed in the UK) and a distributed honeypots 
network of 150 honeypots running in 50 sites around 
the world. We observed that both the total number of 
packets launched by attackers and the total number of 
attackers per honeypot differed in the three networks: 
Leurre.com distributed honeypots network had the 
highest average number of packets per honeypot and 
by far the highest number of distinct attacker IPs. We 
compared the traffic from IP addresses that attack more 
than one network. We saw that over 60% of attacking 
IPs observed in the corporate honeynet (which 
contributed more than 90% of the traffic in this 
honeynet) were also observed in the Leurre.com 
network. This percentage is smaller when we compare 
the SME and Leurre.com (34.2% of SME attacking IPs 
were observed in Leurre.com), CORP with SME or all 
three.  
There is some consistency in the top ranking 
countries of origin of the attackers in the three 
networks: IP addresses from the United States are the 
most frequent and exchange the most packets with the 
honeypots in any of the three networks, with Chinese 
IP addresses also being in the top 5.  
We analyzed the prolificacy of the attacking IP 
addresses with respect to the number of honeypots they 
attack in the Leurre.com network. We observed that 
among the top 10 most prolific attacking IPs 7 are from 
China. This would indicate that Chinese IP addresses 
are more prone to scanning a large number of hosts 
rather than concentrating their attacks against single 
hosts. When we look at the times in which the 
Leurre.com honeypots are discovered (i.e. the times 
between first packet exchanges for a given attacking 
host and any of the honeypots in Leurre.com network) 
we observed seemingly different strategies being 
employed by the attackers: most of the attackers seem 
to be going through high number of hosts in 
Leurre.com very quickly before the rate of discovery of 
new hosts drops, whereas for some the opposite is true 
(they discover very few new hosts initially and then the 
rate increases). We also observed that the total number 
of packets exchanged with the honeypots in 
Leurre.com is relatively low for the prolific hosts. This 
may suggest that these hosts are involved in 
“intelligence gathering” at this stage: probing with very 
few packets which hosts are alive and what services 
they are running before they decide to launch more 
concentrated attacks against a few hosts they determine 
to be more vulnerable. 
A few other interesting observations include: 
- the persistence of attackers (i.e. the number of 
packets that an attacker will launch against a 
network) seems to follow the Power law: a 
proportionally small number of attackers for each 
given network are responsible for very large 
amount of the malicious traffic. 
- a simple preferential attachment model was given, 
which predicts that the probability of the next 
attack coming from an attacking IP is proportional 
to the number of attackers. 
- initial analysis with part of the data for the 
corporate and SME honeynets suggests that square 
root of time for an attacker who attacks one of 
these honeynets to attack the other is exponentially 
distributed with mean of approximately 10. 
- the scanning sequence of the hosts in the same 
network seems to be predominantly in sequential 
ascending order. This phenomenon was also 
reported in a related study of the Leurre.com 
network data [14] (although the ordering observed 
in [14] was either ascending or descending). 
We are working to extend the preliminary analysis 
reported here to develop statistical models for attack 
behaviour e.g. the propagation time of an attack from 
one network to another. We are interested in 
experimenting with adaptive defence strategies for a 
single network based on measuring traffic to itself and 
some statistical models for the internet as a whole. We 
are also interested in inferring global behaviour from a 
comparative analysis of these different networks. Other 
possibilities for future work include: 
- repeating the analysis for a different period with 
these networks and comparing the results. It may 
especially be interesting to analyze what happens 
with the IP addresses that were identified as 
“persistent” and “prolific” in this period. Will the 
“prolific” IP addresses (i.e. the ones that were 
scanning a lot of hosts) launch more “persistent” 
attacks against a smaller number of hosts?  
- define precise null hypotheses that can be tested 
with the observations. 
- define initial exploratory models and more refined 
explanatory probabilistic models for predicting  
variables of interest, e.g. the time between attacks 
in different networks. 
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